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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
of the master's duty. The resultant legal relationship created
between the master and rider is not that of host-guest.l ° In
some instances, the degree of the servant's tort necessary to
make the master liable would be the same regardless of
whether there was authority to extend the invitation."
PATENTS
CONSENT DECREES AND RES JUDICATA
In a suit for infringement of a patent, the defendants
raised the issue of patent validity. An earlier suit between
the same parties for infringement of the same patent resulted
in a consent decree in plaintiff's favor. Held: The consent
decree did not estop defendants from questioning the validity
of the patent in this suit. The patent is invalid., Addresso-
graph-Multigraph Corp. v. Cooper et al., 156 F. (2d) 483
(C.C.A. 2nd, 1946) . 2
Although a consent decree has been interpreted to be
but a contract between the parties, 3 the federal rule now
10. Thomas v. Southern Lumber Co., 181 S.W.(2d) 111 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1944); Lassiter v. Shell Oil Co., 188 Wash. 371, 62 P. (2d)
1096 (1944).
11. In Thomas v. Southern Lumber Co., supra n.10, the court said,
p. 115: " . . . the legal duty which the owner or operator owes a
gratuitous guest is practically the same as that which the owner
of real property used for private purposes owes to a mere licensee.
Hence it appears immaterial in this case from the standpoint of
Hammon's (the employer's) liability for the torts of Frederick(the driver) whether Nolan Thomas (the rider) be regarded as a
trespasser, licensee, or guest in the truck because the test of
liability would be practically the same in either of these contin-
gencies."
A problem of privilege might arise in those jurisdictions where
the duty owed to a gratuitous guest by the driver differs from
that owed to a trespasser by the master. If the duty owed by the
driver to his guest were less than that owed to. a trespasser by
the master, would the driver's non-liability under the statute cloak
the master with immunity? O'Leary v. Fash, 245 Mass. 123, 140
N.E. 282 (1923), in observing that the rights of the trespasser-
guest to recover against the master should be no higher than his
rights against the host-driver would seem to answer the question
in the affirmative. Richard's v. Parker, 19 Tenn. App 645, 93
S.W.(2d 639 (1935), indicates that the guest of the principal
is entitled to no greater rights against the agent than against the
principal under the "guest" statute. It would seem logical that
the converse should be true.
1. Clark, J., dissenting. Majority opinion by Woodbury, Swan, J.J.
2. This is in affirmance of the district court. Addressograph-Mul-
tigraph Corp. v. Cooper et al., 60 F. Supp. 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
3. Hodgson v. Vroom, 266 Fed. 267 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1920); 3 Freeman,
Judgments (5th Ed. 1925) §1350.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
established holds a consent decree to be a judicial act4 and
conclusive in the absence of fraud and mistakeA
In the instant case, the consent decree was held to be
invalid for want of an adjudication of infringement.6 The
court stated that on grounds of public policy, a decree en-
tered by consent did not estop,7 nor was it res judicata as
to validity without an adjudication of infringement or a
grant of some relief from which infringement could be in-
ferred8
4. U.S. v. Swift and Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932); Coca-Cola Co. v.
Standard Bottling Co., 138 F.(2d) 788 (C.C.A. 10th, 1943);
O'Cedar Corp. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 66 F.(2d) 363 (C.C.A.
7th, 1933); U.S. v. Radio Corp. of America, 46 F. Supp. 654
(D. Del., 1942).
5. O'Cedar Corp. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 66 F.(2d) 363 (C.C.A.
7th, 1933); Utah Power and Light Co. v. U.S., 42 F.(2d) 304
(Ct. Cl. 1930).
6. The consent decree held that patent was good and valid and that
the plaintiff was possessed of title, and continued: "Whereas
defendants ... have merely furnished to others ... but have not
made or sold the aforesaid printing plates and have no intention
of making, using or selling ... plaintiff has waived the issuance
of an injunction against, and an accounting by, the defendants..."
7. To bolster its holding, the majority opinion elaborates on several
decisions, not too pertinent except as indicative of a public in-
terest in patents which of course was early recognized in Kendall
v. Winsor, 21 How. 322 (U.S. 1858), and Dinsmore v. Schofield,
102 U.S. 375,378 (1880). Of the cases cited Pope Mfg. Co. v.
Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892) denied specific performance of
an inequitable contract but refused to hold it unenforcible at law;
Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241(1939) allowed a defendant to appeal (not to attack collaterally)
a decree of valid and not infringed; Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. (2d)
541 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1942) surprisingly restricted procedural free-
dom by inequitably denying to an appellant patentee relief anal-
ogous to that granted to the defendant in the Electrical Fittings
Case, supra; Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943) merely
permitted a defendant to counterclaim patent invalidity, a sit-
uation quite remote from a collateral attack; Mercoid v. Mid-
Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1943) held that a con-
tributory infringer was not estopped in a later suit from setting
up as a counterclaim a statutory cause of action. Sinclair &
Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327 (1945) stressed the
desirability of determining the validity of the patent as well as
the question of infringement; Grant Paper Box Co. v. Russell
Box Co., 151 F.(2d) 886,890 (C.C.A. 1st, 1945) followed the rec-
ommendation of the Sinclair case but discussed the logical dif-
ficulties encountered, and on rehearing held the patent valid, 154
F. (2d) 729 (C.C.A. 1st, 1946).
8. Then follows this statement, "In other words, we think the public
interest in a judicial determination of the invalidity of a worthless
patent is great enough to warrant the conclusion that a defend-
ant is not estopped by a decree of validity at least when the de-
cree was by consent, unless it is clear that in the litigation re-
sulting in the decree the issue of validity was genuine." This
1947]
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However, bearing in mind that the patentee has the
right to exclude others from making, using or selling his in-
vention, the consent decree despite its informal provisions
did adjudicate infringement. The decree recited that defend-
ants had furnished but had not made or sold the patented
plate to others.1 Under prior decisions, the defendants' ac-
tions would constitute an infringing use." Further, the de-
cree recited that it was only because the defendants repre-
sented that they had no intention of making, using or selling
the plate that the plaintiff waived an injunction. This reci-
tation of waiver necessarily implies the relinquishing of a
right which in this instance could arise only by virtue of
infringement.12
The public interest heavily relied upon by the majority
opinion, has long been recognized's and recently has been
statement is not merely an alternative expression, but it calls
for an alternative procedure, i.e., an actual litigation of validity.
Such procedure would annihilate the effectiveness of consent de-
crees even though infringement was admitted and formally recited.
9. Customarily a consent decree recites patent validity, title and
infringement, a grant of injunction, and perhaps further relief
such as an accounting.
10. The court had before it a deposition of one of the defendants
"and testimony which admitted furnishing the patented plates to
another.
11. The furnishing of a patented tube to others through the mail or
by salesmen merely as advertising and not for monetary com-
pensation constituted infringement, Patent Tube Corp. v. Bristol-
Myers Co., 25 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y., 1938); the operative dem-
onstration of an alleged infringing machine to prosepective buyers
constituted a use, Scott and Williams, Inc. v. Hemphill Co., 14
F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y., 1931); personal use of a water well
driven by a patented process was a forbidden use, Beedle v. Ben-
nett, 122 U.S. 71 (1887); to employ a patented article in any
manner for beneficial uses of a pecuniary character is an in-
vasion of the privileges of the patentee, 3 Robinson, "Patents"
(1890), p. 62. But, a use solely for gratifying a philosophical taste
or curiosity or for instruction and amusement is not an infringing
use, Poppenhausen v. Falke, 4 Blatchf. 493, Fed. Cas. No. 11,279
(C.C.S.D.N.Y., 1861).
12. The majority opinion overlooked the fact that the recitation in
the decree of both a "furnishing" of the patented item and a
"waiver" expressed alternatively, nonetheless adjudicated infringe-
ment. Nor was it material that defendants were unwilling to
have the decree state baldly that they infringed, so that alterna-
tive language was employed.
13. Sinclair and Carroll Corp. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327
(1945); U.S. v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Morton
Salt v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Aero Spark Plug
Corp. v. B. G. Corp., 130 F.(2d) 290,293 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1942);
Booth Fisheries Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 48 F. Supp. 313
Del., 1942).
278 [Vol. 22
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
could have been raised.-° Despite a decree's inadequacy 20 or
its grant of relief without adequate foundation, 21 it is con-
clusive upon the parties if entered by consent. Thus, in the
instant case, even had the decree been defective for want of
an adjudication of infringement, it had been entered with
defendants' consent and therefore should have been binding.
PROCEDURE
PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE IN INDIANA
The Indiana Supreme Court in 1940 adopted in substance
the federal rule providing for pre-trial conference procedure.'
The 1940 rule was retained verbatim in the 1943 revision of
the Supreme Court Rules.2
19. Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis R.R."v. U.S., 113 U.S. 261(1885).
20. U.S. v. Radio Corp. of America, 46 F.Supp,. 654 (D.Del., 1942).
21. Cushman and Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Grammes, 234 Fed. 952
(E.D.Pa., 1916). Even if a decree is entered without support of
facts, it is not void, U.S. v. Swift and Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932);
consent cannot give juridiction, but it may bind the parties and
waive previous errors if, when the court acts, jurisdiction has
been obtained, Pacific Railroad v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289 (1879).
1. Fed. R. Civ. P., 16.
2. Rules of the Indiana Supreme Court, Rule 1-4:
"In any action except criminal cases, the court may in its discre-
tion and shall upon motion of any party, direct the attorneys for
the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider:
(a) The simplification and closing of the issues;
(b) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the plead-
ings;
(c) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of
documents which will avoid unnecessary proof or the
introduction of unnecessary evidence;
(d) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(e) Such other matters as may expedite the determination
of the action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken
at the conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and
the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters con-
sidered which limit the issues for trial to those not disposed of by
admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered
shall control the subsequent course of the action, unless modified
thereafter to prevent manifest injustice. The court in its discre-
tion may establish by rule a pre-trial calendar on which actions
may be placed for consideration as above provided, and may either
confine the calendar to jury actions or non-jury actions or extend
it to all actions."
In comparing the Indiana and Federal Rules, it should be
noted that the following portions of the Indiana Rule are omitted
in' the Federal Rule: " ... and shall upon the motion of any
party . . . " (first paragraph), " . . . and closing of the issues;"
(clause (a)), " . . . or the introduction of unnecessary evidence;"
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